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# Korean Affairs Report

(FOUO 4/82)



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## KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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**S. KOREA/ MILITARY AFFAIRS**

**JAPANESE JOURNAL ANALYZES SOUTH KOREAN DEFENSE POLICY**

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese No. 195 Jun 82 pp 168-170

[Article "The 1982 ROK National Defense Policy"; originally published in JAPAN MILITARY REVIEW, June 1982]

[Text] The Republic of Korea [ROK] this year started implementing the "Second Plan for Strengthening Its Fighting Capabilities." The plan reportedly requires \$23.8 billion.

Coinciding with this, President Chong himself delivered a "Policy Speech for the Year 1982" on 22 January 1982. In it, he set forth the 1982 national defense policy, including the "establishment of an actual fighting defense structure" and the "productive operation of national defense budget." The National Assembly also carried out intensive interpellations on a government national defense policy which is designed to cope with a threat from North Korea.

**National Defense Policy, 1982**

1. We will exert our efforts to establish an actual fighting defense structure, to consolidate a national mobilization system, to strengthen spiritual fighting capabilities and to manage and operate national budget in a productive way so that an iron-like defense posture both in the front-line and in the rear area may be maintained. Such a defense posture is needed to defend national security and peace, and the life and property of the people, from a threat of war.
2. We will continuously exert our efforts to improve new strategies and tactics which are designed to strengthen our national defense posture and to foster the highly developed combat capabilities of our armed forces through joint military exercises.
3. By continuously promoting the development of the defense industry we will establish the system of research and development for highly developed precision weapons and the system of mass production.

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**Instructions Given By President Chong To the Ministry of National Defense**

After receiving a briefing from the minister of national defense at the Blue House (presidential mansion/office) on 21 February regarding the ministry's operational plans for this year, President Chong gave the minister of national defense the following 3-item instructions:

1. To insure that the structure of the armed forces be reorganized and developed into that with a primary emphasis placed on the improvement of fighting capabilities and that a defense posture be maintained to the maximum by strengthening the spiritual fighting capability of the armed forces.
2. To make efforts to thoroughly carry out education and management of reserve forces and to manage and operate the budget in a productive way.
3. To insure that the armed forces delegate a substantial scope of responsibility and authority to their subordinate units at each level so that the creativity and capability of each unit may be maximized.

The president used to receive an annual briefing from and to give necessary instructions to each ministry at the ministry concerned; however, it seems that this procedure has been replaced with a report made by each minister at the Blue House.

**Answers by the Government at an Extraordinary National Assembly Session**

The 110th extraordinary session of the National Assembly was convened from 26 February through 13 March. At this session there were intensive inquiries from opposition party members regarding the question of national defense. Following are answers given by the government to the inquiries made by opposition party members.

**1. On Developing Nuclear Weapons**

Judging from the fact that it would be more advantageous to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella than possessing Korea's own nuclear weapons, the government has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. (Answer by the minister of national defense.)

**2. On the Length of Military Service**

Right now the length of military service for the navy and the air force is 35 months, whereas the army and the marine corps require 33 months' service. The length of military service is scheduled to be reduced to 30 months for the army and the marine corps by the year 1984 by reducing one month per year. (Answer by the vice minister of national defense.)

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**3. On the Defense Industry**

Since we have a capability to produce most of basic weapons and some of highly developed precision weapons, we maintain a level identical to that of North Korea. It is believed, however, that the ROK will outnumber North Korea in all of the fields by the first half of the 1980's. (Answer by vice minister of national defense.)

On the defense industry, the minister of commerce and industry on 5 March also said: "Fighter aircraft assembled and produced in our country will make a debut sometime this year."

**4. On Military Preparations by North Korea and Our Countermeasures**

Although there always exists a possibility of provoking a reckless southward invasion by the North, we are taking a perfect-combat-readiness posture.

The ROK armed forces are taking a defense posture for a showdown with the North while firmly defending the present frontline with an emphasis on the cosmopolitan area. We are strengthening a defense posture against the infiltration of North Korean irregular warfare troops and are also continuously augmenting the capability of an early warning.

It is important, however, to strengthen the fighting capability of reserve forces in irregular warfare. There have been some problematic points thus far in training reserve forces and augmenting arms.

Five islands in the Western Sea (Yellow Sea) are the area where the possibility of limited provocations by North Korea is quite great. However, we have already fortified these five islands and are taking a posture which would enable us to immediately cope with and retaliate for any enemy provocation.

Moreover, North Korea has deployed some 20 conventional submarines and a small number of minisubmarines in the eastern and western seas. These submarines plan to blockade major South Korean ports and bays and to jeopardize sea lane traffic. Multidimensional measures are worked out in the critical zone of both the eastern and southern seas in preparation for such an attack by North Korea. Such countermeasures as the installation of barricades and the reinforcement of antitank weapons to cope with an attack by North Korean tanks are worked out. North Koreans are capable of simultaneously infiltrating some 2,500 personnel by some 260 AN-2 planes. We have already worked out a set of regional defensive measures; for example, a network of an early warning system in the area where the enemy infiltrators are assumed to be parachuted and a deployment of armored striking forces. (Answer by vice minister of national defense.)

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5. On the Management of National Defense Budget

We have already compiled a budget based on zero-point. We plan to carry out productive budget management by actively promoting an armywide conservation campaign. (Answer by vice minister of national defense.)

6. On Military Diplomacy

We intend to achieve superiority over North Korea by formulating a medium- and long-range plan for military diplomacy, under which invitation and visitation diplomacy and the activity of public information will be strengthened.

To achieve these objectives, we intend to strengthen and promote military cooperation not only with our allies but also with nonaligned countries. (Answer by minister of national defense.)

Others

1. Evacuation Training In Time Of An Earthquake As Part of Civil Defense Training

To cope with oft-repeated recent earthquakes, the Ministry of Home Affairs conducted its first evacuation training on 15 March, the "Day of Civil Defense." The Ministry of Home Affairs has decided to conduct further education as part of civil defense training measures which will be taken in time of an earthquake.

2. President Chong Emphasizes the "Accumulation of Strength"

President Chong attended graduation ceremonies which were held at military academies--the Army 38th Class, the Navy 36th Class and the Air Force 30th Class--on 6, 7 and 9 April respectively. In his speeches, President Chong stated: "Peaceful unification is our historic mission."

Delivering an address to academy graduates, President Chong said: "Our biggest enemy is nothing but a war. The best way to prevent a war is to possess more powerful strength than our enemy which intends to touch off a war. Only when we are mightier than our enemy is it inevitable for our enemy to abandon its intention of subjugating us by force of arms. Accordingly, the accumulation of strength is the best way to prevent a war. This is also the best way to accelerate national unification in a peaceful way." Thus, President Chong stressed the need for the "accumulation of strength."

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N. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

SPECULATION ON POSSIBLE POWER STRUGGLE PRESENTED

Tokyo SANKEI SHIMBUN in Japanese 10 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Isuke Hoshino, deputy chief of International News Division: "What Is Happening Now in North Korea?"]

[Text] Contrary to the predictions of many, Kim Chong-il, the crown prince of the "Kim Il-song dynasty" and the secretary of the Korean Labor Party (communist party), was not appointed to any important positions in the government at the Supreme People's Assembly (held on 5 April) of North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). As if related to this mystery, many unprecedented "abnormal" phenomena were observed in the Supreme People's Assembly on this occasion. It seems to be an indication that the power structure of North Korea has begun creaking and that there is a possibility of a power struggle coming into the open hereafter. Although North Korea has been in extremely difficult economic circumstances, it has been making unusual efforts to strengthen its military power. Whether or not such tendencies have anything to do with the creaking at the center of the power is unclear, but the tendencies are interesting in relation to trends in the USSR and the PRC.

Abnormal Conditions in the Supreme People's Assembly

Contrary to the optimistic reporting in party and government newspapers, Kim Chong-il was not chosen vice chairman, which had been rumored, or even a member of the cabinet. Not only that, there are also indications that the Supreme People's Assembly was held in unprecedentedly "abnormal" conditions.

1. Prior to the Supreme People's Assembly held on 5 April, the Central Committee was summoned for an unusual 3 April meeting to discuss items on the agenda for the Supreme People's Assembly. This has never happened in the past. Specialists on North Korea assume that the constitutional amendment and personnel matters relating to the successor issue were manipulated behind the scenes at this meeting of the Central Committee. In particular, they speculate that the issue of Kim Chong-il was intensely discussed in the meeting. The result was to postpone the appointment of Kim Chong-il to a national-level post. It is questionable, however, whether or not one is allowed to express publicly opposite opinions in North Korea.



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2. The Supreme People's Assembly lasted only 1 day this time. Usually it continues 2 or 3 days, and in 1950 discussion in the assembly lasted 8 days. There is no past example of discussions ranging from personnel matters to the budget ending in a day. In ordinary years, Chairman Kim Il-song discusses budget plans and such in his "Words of the New Year." This year, however, he did not say anything about the budget. Concerned sources think that the economic condition in North Korea has worsened considerably. Beginning with Premier Yi Chong-ok, an economic technocrat who had been expected to be transferred this time, most cabinet members remained in their posts. This seems to be related to economic conditions.

3. In this personnel change the most important cabinet posts, defense minister and public security minister, were not announced. Considering the characteristics of the country, these two posts can be strengthened but never abolished. These posts have been occupied by O Chin-u and others of the Kim Chong-il line. Kim Chong-il's strength was his control over the pivotal military and security services. At the same time, he grasped control of the Three Revolutions (thought, technology, and culture). Teams which are elite youth groups certified by Chairman Kim Il-song. These forces have been maneuvering for Kim Chong-il's early succession to the chairmanship.

South Korean intelligence agencies think that these two posts will eventually fall under the actual direct control of Kim Chong-il. But will this actually happen? The power of Kim Chong-il's line depends on how the issue develops.

We do not know the true reason why Kim Chong-il was not appointed to an important position in the national leadership. However, it is easy to imagine that important reasons were the reported repulsion of senior party leaders and the resistance of the country's two closest friends, the USSR and the PRC, which basically oppose Kim Chong-il's succession even though they formally approve it.

Strongly Criticized Three Revolutions Teams

Although criticism of Kim Chong-il himself has not come into the open to the extent reported to the outside, the high-handedness of the Three Revolutions Teams which are said to be under the control of Kim Chong-il and the adventuristic leadership of Kim Chong-il himself have been severely criticized.

Kim Chong-il has also been said to be the leader of the Panmunjon poplar incident that led to a hair-trigger war crisis (note: on 18 August 1976 in the Panmunjon guard area, U.S. and South Korean soldiers cutting poplar trees were attacked by North Korean soldiers and two U.S. officers were killed with axes). Many huge memorials and monuments have recently been built in Pyongyang and other places. This work is also reported to be under the leadership of Kim Chong-il. While North Korea continues in an economic slump, construction of these unproductive monuments and triumphal arches has a high priority in the allocation of human resources and materials. This course of conduct cannot go uncriticized. It has been reported that military forces and laborers clashed in Chongjin last September. There is also information about a clash between military forces and laborers in Sinuiju during November. One specialist says that "disturbances have been occurring in various places."

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On the other hand, both the USSR and the PRC have been opposing Kim Chong-il's succession to the chairmanship. Understandably, their opposition was reflected in the personnel changes. The PRC, in particular, straightforwardly opposed his succession as chairman and pressed North Korea for "an explanation concerning the issue of a successor" in January 1980. A hereditary transfer of power from Kim Il-song to his son, Kim Chong-il, violates the principle of communism that makes the people the heroes of history. Not only that, the PRC fears that approval of a hereditary transfer of power would bounce back to China where the divinity of an individual has just been denied.

## Assuming a Second Korean War?

While offering warnings and criticism, the PRC began reducing economic aid to North Korea in 1980. It reduced the supply of crude oil from the promised amount of 1 million tons to 800,000 tons (in 1981). As a reason, the PRC explained that North Korea did not export primary products to China. The USSR also decreased crude oil supplies from the planned 750,000 tons to 500,000 tons. Its reason was that North Korea did not export nonferrous metals to the USSR in payment. Nevertheless, China reluctantly approved Kim Chong-il's succession last October. Experts believe this was done because of Chinese fears of North Korea's "adventurism."

One example is Kim Yong-nam's (a member of the party's Political Bureau, then the secretary) visit to China last November. At that time, Kim Yong-nam is said to have asked the PRC not to participate in the Seoul Olympic Games as well as sounding out the likelihood of Chinese military cooperation in the "event of a second Korean war." According to experts, Kim Yong-nam said: "South Korea will provoke military action on the Korean Peninsula with the support of Japan and the United States in 1982. North Korea wants China's assistance." Thus, he sought the PRC's cooperation. The PRC rejected the request by saying that "North Korea's view is totally different from the Chinese analysis of the situation." But there is the fact that North Korea carried out large-scale military exercises involving both the government and the people starting last November. The training held from late November through December was of an unprecedentedly large scale. Twelve regular army divisions, special attack units, and militia corps (laborer and farmer red guards) participated in the training. Ordinary trains and ships were also mobilized.

Surprised by the training, the PRC sent Premier Zhao Ziyang to North Korea on 20 December. Although Zhao Ziyang talked with the North Korean side, no joint statement was issued. Even though Kim Yong-nam's request was authentic, North Korea's true intention was unclear. It cannot be said that the danger of war was eliminated by China's rejection. If people's dissatisfaction with economic hardship builds up, governments often start wars in order to divert people's attention to the outside.

It is also unclear whether these movements are in any way related to the issue of Kim Chong-il's succession. Nevertheless, it seems clear from the results of the Supreme People's Assembly that there has been friction in the North Korean power structure and that it has begun creaking.

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